ScatterChat was an encrypted instant messaging client from the Hacktivismo group. It routed chat traffic through Tor and was built for human rights activists and political dissidents. The project was discontinued long ago and gets no maintenance or security fixes, so you should not rely on it today. People with the same needs now use maintained, independently audited tools: Signal for end-to-end encrypted messaging, the Tor Browser from the Tor Project for anonymous browsing, and Briar or SimpleX Chat for messaging without a phone number.
The advisory below dates from September 2006. It covers a flaw in the copy of Tor that came bundled with ScatterChat’s Windows installer. Read it as a historical record of a bug that was fixed in 2006.
Advisory at a glance
| Item | Detail (2006) |
|---|---|
| Advisory | ScatterChat Advisory 2006-02, technical report |
| Date | September 2, 2006 |
| Affected component | The Tor program bundled with the ScatterChat Windows installer |
| Affected Tor versions | 0.1.0.x before 0.1.0.18 and 0.1.1.x before 0.1.1.23 |
| Affected ScatterChat versions | Before 1.0.2 (NVD lists 1.0.1 and earlier) |
| Attacker | A malicious or compromised Tor entry node |
| Effect | Unwanted traffic routed through the client, or a crash (denial of service) |
| Tor Project advisory | August 29, 2006 |
| CVE published | August 31, 2006 |
| Status today | Fixed in 2006; ScatterChat itself has been abandoned |
CVE ID:
OSVDB:
,
Secunia also tracked the issue at the time as advisories SA21708 (Tor) and SA21725 (ScatterChat). OSVDB, the open vulnerability database, has since shut down. That leaves the CVE entry in the US National Vulnerability Database (NVD) as the main permanent reference.
Summary
ScatterChat (
) was an instant messaging project. Its goal was to give non-technical users, such as human rights activists and political dissidents, encryption and anonymity through Tor. Hacktivismo released it at the HOPE Number Six conference in New York in July 2006. It was a “friendly fork” of the Gaim (now Pidgin) chat client, licensed under the GPL.
The vulnerabilities were in the external Tor program that came with ScatterChat’s Windows installer, not in ScatterChat’s own code. A Tor entry node could use them to route traffic through the client, or to crash the client’s Tor process with malformed input.
The advisory rated the impact as low.
Details
The official Tor advisory can be found at:
http://archives.seul.org/or/announce/Aug-2006/msg00001.html
The Tor Project sent its advisory, titled “Tor security advisory: clients will route traffic”, to the tor-announce list on August 29, 2006. It said a malicious entry node (the first relay in a user’s circuit) could route arbitrary Tor traffic through the client, making the client act as a relay. Every 0.1.1.x release before 0.1.1.23 was affected. Secunia described two unspecified errors in how Tor handled communication. One let a malicious server push traffic through a client, and the other let it crash the client.
Tor 0.1.1.23 had already shipped on August 4, 2006. The advisory came out later and told users to upgrade to at least that version. NVD’s entry for CVE-2006-4508 also lists the older 0.1.0.x branch before 0.1.0.18 as affected.
Impact
The advisory rated the impact on end users as low.
If a malicious or compromised Tor entry node exploited these issues, the user’s local Tor process could crash. The user’s computer could also end up relaying traffic to other Tor nodes.
Relaying unwanted traffic used up the user’s bandwidth for as long as ScatterChat was running.
A crash also had a practical side effect. While Tor was down, ScatterChat’s anonymity feature stopped working until Tor restarted. Nothing in the advisory says the flaw exposed message contents or let anyone run code on the user’s computer.
Solution
In 2006, the advisory told every Windows user of ScatterChat’s anonymity feature to upgrade to ScatterChat 1.0.2, which shipped with a fixed version of Tor.
That advice no longer applies. ScatterChat 1.0.2 was the last fix for this issue, and the project has received no maintenance since. Its bundled Tor is nearly two decades out of date and cannot reliably connect to today’s Tor network. Old installers from mirrors or archives are unsafe and cannot be verified. Do not install ScatterChat now.
What to use instead, depending on what you need:
| Need | Maintained tool | What it protects | What it does not protect |
|---|---|---|---|
| Private one-to-one and group chat | Signal | Message content is end-to-end encrypted with the Signal Protocol | You need a phone number to register (usernames can hide it from contacts). It does not hide your IP address from Signal’s servers by default |
| Anonymous browsing | Tor Browser (Tor Project) | Hides your IP address from the sites you visit and resists browser fingerprinting | Cannot protect you if you log in to accounts tied to your identity, or if your device has malware |
| Messaging without a phone number or central servers | Briar | Peer-to-peer, end-to-end encrypted, routes over Tor, can work over Bluetooth or Wi-Fi when the internet is down | Android-focused. Both people generally need to be online for messages to arrive |
| Messaging without user identifiers | SimpleX Chat | End-to-end encrypted, no user IDs or phone numbers | Relay servers can still see some connection metadata unless you route traffic over Tor |
Keep these tools updated. A Tor flaw like this one is fixed only once you install the patched release.
Lessons from this advisory
This advisory shows the most lasting risk of bundled software. ScatterChat’s own code was not at fault, but its users inherited Tor’s bug. They stayed exposed until the ScatterChat developers repackaged a fixed Tor and each user installed the new version. When a project stops, the bundled parts stop getting updates too.
This was also not ScatterChat’s only problem. In August 2006, researchers writing on Light Blue Touchpaper, the security blog of the University of Cambridge Computer Laboratory, described protocol flaws in ScatterChat’s own design. They included a non-standard encryption mode based on ECB (electronic codebook) with custom padding. The most serious flaw became CVE-2006-4021: an attacker who saw enough messages could detect patterns in them through a birthday attack. Their conclusion was short: protocol design is hard. Today’s audited tools use well-studied protocols such as the Signal Protocol rather than custom schemes.
About the advisory
J. Salvatore Testa II, ScatterChat’s lead developer at Hacktivismo, wrote the advisory and signed it with his PGP key. Hacktivismo stopped developing ScatterChat long ago. The project’s original contact details, keys and download links are obsolete and have been removed from this page.
A less technical summary of this advisory was also published:
http://www.scatterchat.com/advisories/2006-02_non_tech.html
FAQ
Is ScatterChat still safe to use?
No. ScatterChat has not been maintained for many years. Its Tor component and its cryptography are badly out of date, and the design had published flaws such as CVE-2006-4021. Use a maintained, audited tool like Signal, Briar or SimpleX Chat instead.
Does this Tor vulnerability affect Tor today?
No. The Tor Project fixed it in Tor 0.1.1.23 and 0.1.0.18 in 2006, and those release branches were retired long ago. Current Tor and Tor Browser releases are not affected. The only people still exposed would be anyone running an ancient bundled copy of Tor, such as an old ScatterChat install.
What is a Tor entry node, and why could it attack the client?
The entry node, also called a guard, is the first relay in your Tor circuit. It is the only relay that sees your real IP address. Because it talks directly to your Tor client, a malicious entry node could send the malformed input that triggered this bug. That is one reason Tor clients keep a small, stable set of guards instead of choosing new ones constantly.
Did this flaw reveal ScatterChat messages or user identities?
The advisory and the Tor Project’s notice describe two effects: unwanted traffic routed through the user’s machine, and a crash of the Tor process. Neither source says message contents were exposed. A crash did stop ScatterChat’s anonymity feature until Tor restarted, which mattered for users who depended on it.
What replaced ScatterChat for activists and journalists?
No single app replaced it. Signal became the common choice for end-to-end encrypted chat. Briar was built for activists who need to communicate during internet shutdowns. Tor Browser covers anonymous web access. The EFF’s Surveillance Self-Defense guides explain how to choose and set up these tools for your own situation.
Where can I check details of an old vulnerability like this one?
Start with the CVE entry in NVD (here, CVE-2006-4508), which lists affected versions and references. The Tor Project keeps its old tor-announce mailing list posts in a public archive, including the original August 2006 advisory. Use these primary sources rather than old download sites.
Sources
- NVD: CVE-2006-4508
- Tor Project: Tor security advisory: clients will route traffic (August 29, 2006)
- Tor Project: Tor 0.1.1.23 is released (August 2006)
- CIRCL CVE search: CVE-2006-4021
- Light Blue Touchpaper: Protocol design is hard, flaws in ScatterChat
- LWN.net: ScatterChat coverage (July 2006)
- Wikipedia: Hacktivismo
- EFF Surveillance Self-Defense: Tool guides
- EFF: Free Signal guide (May 2026)